Vollstaendiger CT-scoped Sollzustand fuer den Reverse-Proxy-LXC: Konten/SSH-Drop-in (reverse_proxy_access), nftables (reverse_proxy_firewall), NPM- und Fail2Ban-Quadlets inkl. Jails/Filter (reverse_proxy_npm, reverse_proxy_fail2ban), LXC-Baseline sowie preflight/audit/bootstrap/ verify-deploy-access/site/verify-production-Playbooks fuer die Inventare agent/bootstrap/production. NPM-Runtime-Daten (DB, Zertifikate, Proxyhosts) bleiben bewusst aussen vor (Restore aus CT-Backup). Verifiziert am 09.11.2026 gegen den Live-Host: preflight.yml (agent) ok=15 failed=0; verify-production.yml (production) ok=27 changed=0 failed=0; site.yml --check changed=0 (konvergent und idempotent). Host-Key-Fingerprint, Hostname, Debian 13.7, 10.0.0.10, 2 vCPU/1024 MB matchen die Inventory-Safeguards. Generated by Mistral Vibe. Co-Authored-By: Mistral Vibe <vibe@mistral.ai>
CT 103 reverse proxy Ansible project
This self-contained host project manages the production reverse proxy LXC
(CT 103, reverse-proxy, 10.0.0.10: Nginx Proxy Manager, Fail2Ban, nftables).
It follows the CT 100 Pi-hole and CT 101 Samba project schema, uses the
repository-wide pinned control dependency and the shared podman_runtime
role, while all CT 103 inventories, playbooks, keys and service roles remain
inside the CT 103 root.
Create the repository-level control environment once:
python3 -m venv .venv
.venv/bin/python -m pip install --upgrade pip
.venv/bin/python -m pip install -r shared/ansible/requirements-control.txt
Run commands from this directory and always select an inventory explicitly:
cd proxmox/lxc/ct-103-reverse-proxy/ansible
../../../../.venv/bin/ansible-playbook \
--inventory inventories/agent/hosts.yml \
playbooks/preflight.yml \
--private-key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_ghostnet_ct103_agent
Adoption sequence for the pre-Ansible CT 103
The LXC was hardened and accepted before this project existed (GNAI-006). The adoption path mirrors CT 100 and keeps the production proxy intact:
preflight.ymlon theagentinventory (read-only, unprivileged,--private-key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_ghostnet_ct103_agent) proves identity, service health, listeners and the local NPM admin answer.audit-production.ymlon thebootstrapinventory (read-only, become throughghost,--ask-become-pass) deep-audits the root-only state and reports the known drifts instead of failing on them.bootstrap.ymlon thebootstrapinventory adopts theansible-deployaccount, the NOPASSWD sudo policy and the unified SSH drop-in; keep a second session or the Proxmox console open while SSH policy changes are applied.verify-deploy-access.ymlon theproductioninventory proves the new deployment boundary (--private-key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_ghostnet_ct103_ansible_deploy).site.yml --check --diffon theproductioninventory previews the convergence. Expected changes: the SSH drop-in gainsAllowUsers ansible-deploy,AllowStreamLocalForwarding noandDisableForwarding yes; SSH socket activation is replaced by the classicssh.service;/etc/nftables.confis rewritten with the managed marker (identical rules); the two stale Quadlet backups are removed.site.ymlconverges;verify-production.ymlplus a secondsite.yml --checkrun withchanged=0complete the adoption.
The production verifier is read-only. A real site.yml run enforces the
declared state and therefore requires an explicit change authorization.
Declared scope and deliberate non-goals
- NPM runtime data (SQLite database, keys, Let's Encrypt certificates, proxy hosts), the Fail2Ban configuration tree and ban database, and the NPM admin password are backup-restored runtime artifacts. They are never created, read or transported by these playbooks.
postfix.serviceis present on the host but outside the GNAI-006 declared state; this project neither installs nor removes it. The operator decides whether to retire it.- The functional Fail2Ban acceptance (GNAI-006 section 12) stays an operator-run procedure; this project only pins the quadlet, jails and filters.
- Do not store secret contents, private SSH keys or NPM access-log data in this repository.