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Add more verbose logging for message integrity :)

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This commit is contained in:
ghost 2025-12-28 22:32:46 +01:00
parent d02771b4f8
commit 5486744bee
2 changed files with 69 additions and 6 deletions
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30
src/auth.rs
View File

@ -3,7 +3,13 @@
use crate::config::AuthOptions;
use crate::constants::{ATTR_NONCE, ATTR_REALM, ATTR_USERNAME};
use crate::models::stun::StunMessage;
use crate::stun::{find_message_integrity, validate_message_integrity, validate_message_integrity_len_preserved};
use crate::stun::{
compute_message_integrity_adjusted,
compute_message_integrity_len_preserved as compute_mi_len_preserved,
find_message_integrity,
validate_message_integrity,
validate_message_integrity_len_preserved,
};
use crate::traits::CredentialStore;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use base64::Engine;
@ -204,12 +210,24 @@ impl<S: CredentialStore + Clone> AuthManager<S> {
return AuthStatus::Granted { username, key };
}
// No acceptance without MI validation.
// No acceptance without MI validation. Emit detailed diagnostics.
let mi_attr = find_message_integrity(msg).map(|a| hex::encode(&a.value));
let mi_long = hex::encode(&crate::stun::compute_message_integrity(&key, msg.raw.as_slice()));
let mi_short = hex::encode(&crate::stun::compute_message_integrity(short_key, msg.raw.as_slice()));
warn!("auth reject: bad credentials username={} realm={} peer={} a1_md5={} mi_attr={:?} mi_long(fullmsg)={} mi_short(fullmsg)={}",
username, realm, peer, hex::encode(&key), mi_attr, mi_long, mi_short);
let mi_long_adj = compute_message_integrity_adjusted(msg, &key).map(hex::encode);
let mi_long_len = compute_mi_len_preserved(msg, &key).map(hex::encode);
let mi_short_adj = compute_message_integrity_adjusted(msg, short_key).map(hex::encode);
let mi_short_len = compute_mi_len_preserved(msg, short_key).map(hex::encode);
warn!(
"auth reject: bad credentials username={} realm={} peer={} a1_md5={} mi_attr={:?} mi_long_adj={:?} mi_long_len={:?} mi_short_adj={:?} mi_short_len={:?}",
username,
realm,
peer,
hex::encode(&key),
mi_attr,
mi_long_adj,
mi_long_len,
mi_short_adj,
mi_short_len
);
AuthStatus::Reject {
code: 401,
reason: "Bad Credentials",

45
src/stun.rs
View File

@ -386,6 +386,51 @@ pub fn validate_message_integrity(msg: &StunMessage, key: &[u8]) -> bool {
false
}
/// Compute the expected MESSAGE-INTEGRITY value following the RFC-adjusted length rule.
pub fn compute_message_integrity_adjusted(msg: &StunMessage, key: &[u8]) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
let mi = find_message_integrity(msg)?;
if mi.value.len() != HMAC_SHA1_LEN {
return None;
}
let mi_end = mi.offset + 4 + HMAC_SHA1_LEN;
if mi_end > msg.raw.len() {
return None;
}
let mut signed = msg.raw[..mi_end].to_vec();
let len = (mi_end - 20) as u16;
let len_bytes = len.to_be_bytes();
signed[2] = len_bytes[0];
signed[3] = len_bytes[1];
let value_start = mi.offset + 4;
for b in &mut signed[value_start..value_start + HMAC_SHA1_LEN] {
*b = 0;
}
Some(crate::stun::compute_message_integrity(key, &signed))
}
/// Compute MESSAGE-INTEGRITY keeping the original header length (interop len-preserved mode).
pub fn compute_message_integrity_len_preserved(msg: &StunMessage, key: &[u8]) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
let mi = find_message_integrity(msg)?;
if mi.value.len() != HMAC_SHA1_LEN {
return None;
}
let mi_end = mi.offset + 4 + HMAC_SHA1_LEN;
if mi_end > msg.raw.len() {
return None;
}
let mut signed = msg.raw[..mi_end].to_vec();
let value_start = mi.offset + 4;
for b in &mut signed[value_start..value_start + HMAC_SHA1_LEN] {
*b = 0;
}
Some(crate::stun::compute_message_integrity(key, &signed))
}
/// Fallback validator: compute MESSAGE-INTEGRITY without adjusting the STUN header length.
/// Some clients incorrectly leave the header length unchanged when appending FINGERPRINT;
/// this matches that behaviour for interop.