Accept any one MI variants.

This commit is contained in:
ghost 2025-12-28 22:35:50 +01:00
parent 5486744bee
commit abf9b87659
2 changed files with 63 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ use crate::constants::{ATTR_NONCE, ATTR_REALM, ATTR_USERNAME};
use crate::models::stun::StunMessage;
use crate::stun::{
compute_message_integrity_adjusted,
compute_message_integrity_full,
compute_message_integrity_len_preserved as compute_mi_len_preserved,
find_message_integrity,
validate_message_integrity,
@ -216,8 +217,37 @@ impl<S: CredentialStore + Clone> AuthManager<S> {
let mi_long_len = compute_mi_len_preserved(msg, &key).map(hex::encode);
let mi_short_adj = compute_message_integrity_adjusted(msg, short_key).map(hex::encode);
let mi_short_len = compute_mi_len_preserved(msg, short_key).map(hex::encode);
let mi_long_full_adj = compute_message_integrity_full(msg, &key, true).map(hex::encode);
let mi_long_full_len = compute_message_integrity_full(msg, &key, false).map(hex::encode);
let mi_short_full_adj = compute_message_integrity_full(msg, short_key, true).map(hex::encode);
let mi_short_full_len = compute_message_integrity_full(msg, short_key, false).map(hex::encode);
// Accept if any variant matches received MI (still requires correct key).
if let Some(mi_attr_val) = find_message_integrity(msg) {
let mi_bytes = &mi_attr_val.value;
let variants: [(&str, Option<Vec<u8>>); 8] = [
("long_adj", compute_message_integrity_adjusted(msg, &key)),
("long_len", compute_mi_len_preserved(msg, &key)),
("short_adj", compute_message_integrity_adjusted(msg, short_key)),
("short_len", compute_mi_len_preserved(msg, short_key)),
("long_full_adj", compute_message_integrity_full(msg, &key, true)),
("long_full_len", compute_message_integrity_full(msg, &key, false)),
("short_full_adj", compute_message_integrity_full(msg, short_key, true)),
("short_full_len", compute_message_integrity_full(msg, short_key, false)),
];
for (label, cand) in variants.iter() {
if let Some(c) = cand {
if c.len() >= 20 && &c[..20] == mi_bytes.as_slice() {
warn!("auth accept via MI variant={} username={} realm={} peer={} (interop)", label, username, realm, peer);
return AuthStatus::Granted { username, key };
}
}
}
}
warn!(
"auth reject: bad credentials username={} realm={} peer={} a1_md5={} mi_attr={:?} mi_long_adj={:?} mi_long_len={:?} mi_short_adj={:?} mi_short_len={:?}",
"auth reject: bad credentials username={} realm={} peer={} a1_md5={} mi_attr={:?} mi_long_adj={:?} mi_long_len={:?} mi_short_adj={:?} mi_short_len={:?} mi_long_full_adj={:?} mi_long_full_len={:?} mi_short_full_adj={:?} mi_short_full_len={:?}",
username,
realm,
peer,
@ -226,7 +256,11 @@ impl<S: CredentialStore + Clone> AuthManager<S> {
mi_long_adj,
mi_long_len,
mi_short_adj,
mi_short_len
mi_short_len,
mi_long_full_adj,
mi_long_full_len,
mi_short_full_adj,
mi_short_full_len
);
AuthStatus::Reject {
code: 401,

View File

@ -431,6 +431,33 @@ pub fn compute_message_integrity_len_preserved(msg: &StunMessage, key: &[u8]) ->
Some(crate::stun::compute_message_integrity(key, &signed))
}
/// Compute MESSAGE-INTEGRITY over the full raw message (including any attributes after MI).
/// If `adjust_len` is true, the header length is set to `raw.len() - 20`, otherwise preserved.
pub fn compute_message_integrity_full(msg: &StunMessage, key: &[u8], adjust_len: bool) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
let mi = find_message_integrity(msg)?;
if mi.value.len() != HMAC_SHA1_LEN {
return None;
}
let mut signed = msg.raw.clone();
if adjust_len {
let len = (signed.len() - 20) as u16;
let len_bytes = len.to_be_bytes();
signed[2] = len_bytes[0];
signed[3] = len_bytes[1];
}
let value_start = mi.offset + 4;
if value_start + HMAC_SHA1_LEN > signed.len() {
return None;
}
for b in &mut signed[value_start..value_start + HMAC_SHA1_LEN] {
*b = 0;
}
Some(crate::stun::compute_message_integrity(key, &signed))
}
/// Fallback validator: compute MESSAGE-INTEGRITY without adjusting the STUN header length.
/// Some clients incorrectly leave the header length unchanged when appending FINGERPRINT;
/// this matches that behaviour for interop.