Accept any one MI variants.
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5486744bee
commit
abf9b87659
38
src/auth.rs
38
src/auth.rs
@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ use crate::constants::{ATTR_NONCE, ATTR_REALM, ATTR_USERNAME};
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use crate::models::stun::StunMessage;
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use crate::stun::{
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compute_message_integrity_adjusted,
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compute_message_integrity_full,
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compute_message_integrity_len_preserved as compute_mi_len_preserved,
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find_message_integrity,
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validate_message_integrity,
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@ -216,8 +217,37 @@ impl<S: CredentialStore + Clone> AuthManager<S> {
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let mi_long_len = compute_mi_len_preserved(msg, &key).map(hex::encode);
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let mi_short_adj = compute_message_integrity_adjusted(msg, short_key).map(hex::encode);
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let mi_short_len = compute_mi_len_preserved(msg, short_key).map(hex::encode);
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let mi_long_full_adj = compute_message_integrity_full(msg, &key, true).map(hex::encode);
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let mi_long_full_len = compute_message_integrity_full(msg, &key, false).map(hex::encode);
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let mi_short_full_adj = compute_message_integrity_full(msg, short_key, true).map(hex::encode);
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let mi_short_full_len = compute_message_integrity_full(msg, short_key, false).map(hex::encode);
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// Accept if any variant matches received MI (still requires correct key).
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if let Some(mi_attr_val) = find_message_integrity(msg) {
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let mi_bytes = &mi_attr_val.value;
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let variants: [(&str, Option<Vec<u8>>); 8] = [
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("long_adj", compute_message_integrity_adjusted(msg, &key)),
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("long_len", compute_mi_len_preserved(msg, &key)),
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("short_adj", compute_message_integrity_adjusted(msg, short_key)),
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("short_len", compute_mi_len_preserved(msg, short_key)),
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("long_full_adj", compute_message_integrity_full(msg, &key, true)),
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("long_full_len", compute_message_integrity_full(msg, &key, false)),
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("short_full_adj", compute_message_integrity_full(msg, short_key, true)),
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("short_full_len", compute_message_integrity_full(msg, short_key, false)),
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];
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for (label, cand) in variants.iter() {
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if let Some(c) = cand {
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if c.len() >= 20 && &c[..20] == mi_bytes.as_slice() {
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warn!("auth accept via MI variant={} username={} realm={} peer={} (interop)", label, username, realm, peer);
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return AuthStatus::Granted { username, key };
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}
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}
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}
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}
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warn!(
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"auth reject: bad credentials username={} realm={} peer={} a1_md5={} mi_attr={:?} mi_long_adj={:?} mi_long_len={:?} mi_short_adj={:?} mi_short_len={:?}",
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"auth reject: bad credentials username={} realm={} peer={} a1_md5={} mi_attr={:?} mi_long_adj={:?} mi_long_len={:?} mi_short_adj={:?} mi_short_len={:?} mi_long_full_adj={:?} mi_long_full_len={:?} mi_short_full_adj={:?} mi_short_full_len={:?}",
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username,
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realm,
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peer,
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@ -226,7 +256,11 @@ impl<S: CredentialStore + Clone> AuthManager<S> {
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mi_long_adj,
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mi_long_len,
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mi_short_adj,
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mi_short_len
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mi_short_len,
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mi_long_full_adj,
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mi_long_full_len,
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mi_short_full_adj,
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mi_short_full_len
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);
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AuthStatus::Reject {
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code: 401,
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27
src/stun.rs
27
src/stun.rs
@ -431,6 +431,33 @@ pub fn compute_message_integrity_len_preserved(msg: &StunMessage, key: &[u8]) ->
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Some(crate::stun::compute_message_integrity(key, &signed))
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}
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/// Compute MESSAGE-INTEGRITY over the full raw message (including any attributes after MI).
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/// If `adjust_len` is true, the header length is set to `raw.len() - 20`, otherwise preserved.
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pub fn compute_message_integrity_full(msg: &StunMessage, key: &[u8], adjust_len: bool) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
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let mi = find_message_integrity(msg)?;
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if mi.value.len() != HMAC_SHA1_LEN {
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return None;
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}
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let mut signed = msg.raw.clone();
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if adjust_len {
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let len = (signed.len() - 20) as u16;
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let len_bytes = len.to_be_bytes();
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signed[2] = len_bytes[0];
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signed[3] = len_bytes[1];
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}
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let value_start = mi.offset + 4;
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if value_start + HMAC_SHA1_LEN > signed.len() {
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return None;
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}
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for b in &mut signed[value_start..value_start + HMAC_SHA1_LEN] {
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*b = 0;
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}
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Some(crate::stun::compute_message_integrity(key, &signed))
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}
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/// Fallback validator: compute MESSAGE-INTEGRITY without adjusting the STUN header length.
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/// Some clients incorrectly leave the header length unchanged when appending FINGERPRINT;
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/// this matches that behaviour for interop.
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